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LAW AND THE UNIVERSITIES*
PAUL A. FREUNDt
We have heard a good deal in recent years of the relation be-
tween law and the social sciences. No convention of law school
teachers is complete without a program devoted to the contribu-
tions that can be made to the study of law by the disciplines of
economics, psychology, anthropology, and kindred sciences. By
no means do I deplore these exercises in self-depreciation. Hu-
mility, even among those humblest of citizens, university profes-
srs, is good for the soul; and we have seen too little actual
infusion of outside learning in the study of law to create a risk
that the process is really, as Alvin Johnson warned it might be-
come, not cross-fertilization but cross-sterilization of the social
sciences.
My theme is not, however, the contribution that general educa-
tion can make to law. My theme is the less familiar one, the
contribution that law can make to general education. Instead of
concentiating on the content of pre-legal studies for lawyers, I
suggest that some thought be given to the legal content of non-
legal studies. The universities are experimenting successfully
with courses on science for the citizen, aimed at an appreciation
of scientific method or the tactics and strategy of science; courses
have been introduced on economics for the citizen (known affec-
tionately in some places as "economics for the idiot") ; and simi-
larly, in the name of general education, studies have been en-
* Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture, delivered at the School of Law
of Washington University, April 30, 1953.
t Fairchild Professor of Law, Harvard University.
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couraged in the history of the pervasive problems of political
thought. Yet, so far as I am aware, almost no effort has been
made to provide the general student with an introduction to an
understanding of the legal order. The neglect is all the more
striking when we remember that the institutions which are cen-
tral to our civilization-security of the person, freedom of the
mind, ownership, and the intercourse of trade-and which at the
same time are the substance of our daily living, are all dependent
on a structure of law. Should the student, whose preparation for
mature living must include a study of Boyle's law of gases, be
left unexposed to Pound's Spirit of the Common Law and Car-
dozo's Nature of the Judicial Process?
You will see that what I have in mind is no merely "practical"
course in "law for the business man"! or "law for the engineer."
What is wanted is not instruction in how to endorse a check, any
more than general education in science means training in the
repair of an automobile engine, useful and money-saving as both
these accomplishments may be. After all, there are specialists,
lawyers and mechanics, to whom the citizen can turn for these
services. But to understand something of the possibilities and
limitations of science, or the methods and development of the law,
as a basis for judging the serious issues of security and freedom
that beset us-to understand these things is a responsibility
that is nondelegable. In that sense the most "practical" study
may be the most impractical. At long range we hit the target by
aiming above it. The shortcomings of a "practical' course are
suggested by the plight of the boy who was sent to a specialist to
cure a bad case of stammering. After several weeks of intensive
training the boy was discharged, and on being asked whether he
was really cured he could only reply, "I can say 'Peter Piper
picked a peck of pickled peppers,' b-b-but it r-r-rarely oc-c-curs
in c-c-conversation."
At this point several questions have doubtless occurred to you.
First, why address a plea for general education in law to an
audience of lawyers and prospective lawyers? Second, is the
subject matter sufficiently challenging to justify its inclusion in
a program of liberal arts? Third, what themes might be pursued
in a study such as I have proposed?
The first question is easily answered. The plea is addressed to
lawyers because it is they who will have to assume the burden of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss4/1
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devising a course of study, and for the further reason that by
examining our own discipline with this end in view we ourselves
are likely to derive new insights into our own profession.
The second question-whether such a study is intrinsically
worth while-may trouble the layman more than it troubles the
lawyer. If so, that fact is additional evidence of the need for
general education in law. Too many laymen think of lawyers
simply as mouthpieces for interests over which they exercise no
control. The popular attitude toward the lawyer is apt to be less
good-natured than that suggested by Lord Erskine when he
penned some verses commemorating the taking over of a lawyer's
house by an ironmonger:
This house where once a lawyer lived
Is now a smith's, alas;
So rapidly the age of iron
Succeeds the age of brass.'
Does the law display that record of original and creative think-
ing which makes science, for example, so rewarding a subject of
study? As one who is as ignorant of science as the requirements
of this University allowed, I may be inclined to exaggerate the
excitement of transforming thought which is to be found in the
records of science. I think of the professor of science as the
biographer of Willard Gibbs, the Yale mathematician, described
him as he stood before a blackboard exhibiting a beautiful math-
ematical formula. He stood there, his biographer tells us, with
tears streaming down his face and a little group of students
staring at him intently with the look of one who has just seen
angels.2 Very few law professors of my acquaintance could
testify to such an experience. And yet I wonder whether a pro-
fession which can invent the trust and the corporate mortgage
and can draft a Public Utility Holding Company Act need bow
its head even before the achievements of the scientists. Our legal
inventions may be slower to mature and less identifiable with
individuals but they represent transforming thought none the
less. Sometimes, indeed, the invention may be as dramatic as
those of science. When the Supreme Court decided that Califor-
nia, on becoming a state, did not acquire, by implication, the off-
1. HEARD, ODDITIES OF THE LAW 126 (1881).
2. RuKEYsER, WILLARD GIBBS 346 (1942).
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shore oil deposits which had belonged to the United States, since
California was admitted to the Union on an equal footing with
the original states which enjoyed no such ownership," the Gov-
ernment's lawyers were able to maintain that the State of Texas,
which as a Republic had in fact owned its offshore oil, neverthe-
less lost it to the United States by implication through coming in
on an equal footing with other states.4 The lawyers who trans-
formed the equal footing clause in this way must have experi-
enced some of the excitement which we associate with Copernicus
turning the Ptolemaic theory inside out or with Karl Marx when,
as he professed, he stood Hegel on his head.
But more seriously, the lessons to be learned from the history
of science are not very different from those which can be learned
from the history of law. President Conant in his lectures On
Understanding Science has spoken of two major impediments to
scientific progress: a climate of opinion or set of preconceptions
which must be overcome, and crudeness in tools of measurement.
In the eighteenth century the concept of a wondrous substance
called phlogiston long stood in the way of an understanding of
combustion. In the nineteenth century the dominant conception
of a mechanical universe described as matter in motion stood in
the way of the electronic theory. In each case experimental evi-
dence was at hand pointing to the newer concept, but the evi-
dence was long rejected because it failed to square with the
stubbornly held presuppositions of men of science. Something of
the same sort can be found in the history of law. For phlogiston.
and matter in motion one need only substitute liberty of contract
to make the point.
There are parallels to6 in the role of instruments of measure-
ment and computation. Just as the art of long division could
hardly flourish under the system of Roman numerals and the
study of living cells could scarcely be fruitful without the micro-
scope, so justice between man and man has sometimes had to wait
upon refinements in the technique of measurement. In 1876 the
Supreme Court of the United States was confronted with this
problem: What were the rights of the parties where the insured,
under a life insurance policy, had been prevented by the Civil
War from continuing his premium payments from his home in
3. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
4. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
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the South to a company in the North and after the lapse of the
policy he had died?5 Two members of the Court maintained that
impossibility caused by war excuses all obligations and therefore
the beneficiaries of the policy could recover its face amount. Two
members of the Court insisted that the company had promised
to pay only on condition that the premiums were kept up and
that for failure to meet this condition the company was excused
from all liability on the policy. Five members of the Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley, who was something of a mathe-
matician himself and an unusually sagacious judge, found the
solution to the problem in the realm of life insurance accounting.
They analyzed the nature of level payment premiums in the light
of actuarial tables and concluded that the company owed the
beneficiaries something in the nature of the cash surrender value
of the policy.
These comparisons, for which better examples could doubtless
be chosen, suggest that the intellectual issues in the progress of
science and in the progress of law are not so very different. It is
not essential to decide whether developments in the law reflect as
great a degree of originality and creativeness as in science itself,
although the subject has its fascination. As Mr. Justice Holmes
once observed, "What the world pays for is judgment, not the
original mind.",, One need not be cynical to accept that estimate
and to leave unresolved the meaning and significance of origi-
nality. It is enough if the history and system of the law present
problems as challenging for the citizen as those of the natural
and social sciences.
And so the second question merges into the third, namely what
themes might be pursued in the experiment of general education
in the law. The only difficulty here is an abundance of riches. I
would simply suggest two main lines of thought: the method of
law, and movement in the law.
The method of law is usually identified by the layman with the
adversary system. In fact, of course, this is only one aspect of
our profession. It is an aspect, nevertheless, of which there is
need for greater appreciation. When we are asked whether the
lawyer, like the scientist, is really a seeker after truth, the diffi-
culty in answering is due to the impropriety of the form of the
5. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24 (1876).
6. HOLMES, John Marshall, SPEECHES 90 (1913).
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question. The lawyer does not stand alone in his function as an
advocate, but as part of a complex process, and the comparison
must be between the scientist or the scientific process on the one
hand and the adversary system of the law on the other. In this
view the advocate plays his indispensable part in a truth-seeking
enterprise. In fact, a distinguished European scientist has re-
cently held up to science the example of the law as a means of
avoiding unconscious choices of perception and interpretation in
dealing with scientific data. The general relevance of the adver-
sary method was thus described by Michael Polanyi in his
volume The Logic of Liberty:
When you adopt one way of looking at things you destroy at
the same moment some alternative way of seeing them. This
is the reason why open controversy is deliberately used as a
method of discovering the truth. In a courtroom, for ex-
ample, counsels for the prosecution and for the defense are
each required to take one side of the question at issue. It is
supposed that only by committing themselves in opposite
directions can they discover all that can be found in favour
of each side. If, instead, the judge would enter into friendly
consultation with counsel for both sides and seek to establish
agreement between them, this would be considered a gross
miscarriage of justice.7
But advocacy and the adversary system are only the most
dramatic, not the most pervasive, aspects of the method of the
law. There is the less spectacular method of adjustment, accom-
modation and agreement, along with the reduction of the result
to a charter of conduct known as a legal document. The talent
required to negotiate even so simple a transaction as the loan of
an automobile for a week-end, and to produce the charter of con-
duct by means of a choice of words is really comparable, I sug-
gest, to the imagination and verbal facility required in producing
a sonnet or at any rate some stanzas of free verse. Indeed, as in
modern poetry, there is in legal drafting the art of the deliber-
ately unsaid, the art of leaving to others in the future the im-
aginative task of drawing inferences of meaning. When the
framers of our Federal Constitution declined to include among
the powers of Congress that of chartering corporations, they
probably were determining to leave the inference one way or
another to the wisdom of future needs and other minds. You may
7. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LiBERTY 20 (1951).
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remember a somewhat similar example of the wise evasiveness
of draftsmanship in the title of the British monarch as it stood
from the time of Elizabeth I to the year 1800. The story is told
by Maitland in one of his most engaging essays.8 Prior to Eliza-
beth's time the title of the monarch was "By the grace of God of
England, France and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith,
Supreme Head upon Earth of the Church of England and Ire-
land." In Elizabeth's time the magnificent final title "Supreme
Head upon Earth of the Church of England and Ireland" was
replaced by the colorless little phrase "and so forth." How much
of the struggle between Protestants and Catholics, how much
avoidance of clash and freedom of maneuver was meant to be
achieved through the substitution we can only conjecture. Mait-
land concludes that when Elizabeth allowed herself to be "etcet-
erated" she was really declaring herself to be ". . . (if future
events shall so decide, but not further or otherwise) of the
Church of England and also of Ireland upon Earth the Supreme
Head." 9 Could anything be more typically English, or more char-
acteristic of the fine art of legal draftsmanship?
Besides the method of advocacy and of accommodation, there
remains to be noticed what is perhaps the most important of
legal methods, that of translating into institutions the ideals and
purposes of a society. It is here that the lawyer ceases to be
merely the advocate, negotiator or draftsman and becomes the
statesman, not the statesman in office but the citizen as states-
man.
I can think of no better example than the career at the bar
of Mr. Justice Brandeis. The ideas of Brandeis were simple and
"in the air." Indeed, they had been in the air from the beginning
of Western thought down through the nineteenth-century popu-
lists and muckrakers and utopians. He believed that in order
to conserve and develop our greatest natural resource, the talents
of ordinary people, there must be diffusion of both political
power (hence Federalism) and economic power, and a corre-
sponding diffusion of responsibility. Preachers, publicists
and politicians were spreading the gospel, but it was the lawyer's
function to translate these aspirations into the structure of our
8. MAITLAND, Elizabethan Gleanings in 3 COLLEcTED PAPERs 157 (Fisher
ed. 1911).
9. 3 id. at 165.
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institutions, and this was the distinctive contribution of a
Brandeis. Called upon to settle a garment workers' strike, he
seized the occasion to establish a plan of continuous collabora-
tion between management and labor.10 Confronted by findings of
waste and injustices in the field of industrial life insurance, he
devised a system of savings bank life insurance, giving to
workers more assured protection at lower cost and, just as
important, demonstrating that the business could be carried on
successfully by men with modest emoluments and without the
prestige and ramifying power of the conventional financier of
the era.11 Impressed by the need of regulating competition and
preventing monopoly, for to regulate monopoly seemed to him
a fruitless task, he formulated the scheme of what became the
Federal Trade Commission (for whose later checkered career he
was of course not responsible) .12 Faced with the problem of con-
trolling a public utility, he drew up for the regulation of the gas
company in Boston a sliding scale whereby as rates to consumers
were reduced dividends to stockholders could be increased, thus
relying, for bodies corporate as well as for individuals, on the
encouragement of inner impulses rather than external compul-
sion.13 This is not the place to appraise the merits or defects of
each of these devices. It is only important to observe how a
lawyer can make political and economic and even moral ideals
of ancient lineage come alive in the institutions of twentieth
century industrial civilization.
When we turn from methods to movement in the law we shall
find, I think, that during the lifetime of this University the law
has moved toward greater democratization, toward a wider shar-
10. LIEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL
183-191 (1936); MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 291-315 (1946).[A recent conversation with Mr. Meyer Perlstein, International Vice-presi-
dent of the I.L.G.W.U., who participated in these proceedings in 1910, re-
veals that the plan was known as the "Protocol of Peace.' It was Mr.
Filene, President of the famous Boston department store bearing his name,
who called in Justice Brandeis. Other members of the tripartite panel were
Hamilton Holt and Morris Hillquit. Among the specific proposals which
were adopted was the "preferential union shop" as a compromise between
the then much disputed "open" versus "closed" union shop. Mr. Perlstein
whole-heartedly agrees that the credit is due Justice Brandeis. Ed.]
11. LIE, op. cit. s-upra note 10, at 98-106; MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY
(1938).
12. LIEF, op. cit. supra note 10, at 287-292; MASON, op. Cit. supra note 10,
at 402-404.
13. LDE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 76-84; MASON, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 126-140.
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ing of privileges and a wider distribution of the costs of life's
disasters. I do not refer merely to legislative measures of social
security, but to developments in judge-made law as well. The
nineteenth century, with its emphasis on individualism, on un-
bridled competition, on a free field with no favor, all reinforced
by a crude version of the Darwinian theory, tended to make the
element of fault the central criterion of liability. This trend
reached its peak in the creation of the fellow-servant rule as an
escape from employer's liability, and then a counter-trend set in,
with a nudge here and there from the legislatures, resulting in
the abandonment of the fellow-servant rule and the amelioration
of the defense of contributory negligence by the doctrine of last
clear chance. And in the tangled web of proximate cause, the
delight of the classroom and despair of the courtroom, has not
the tendency been to seek the golden thread in the network of
causation?
Likewise the attributes of property have undergone a democra-
tizing change. The case of married women's property is a classic
and non-controversial example. You will recall that at common
law a wife's property became subject to her husband's use and
enjoyment during marriage; that protection was eventually
found in equity for the married woman through a settlement to
her sole and separate use; that this expedient was largely con-
fined in practice to the wealthier classes who employed family
solicitors and made a practice of marriage settlements; and that
finally the legislatures, in the nineteenth century, extended to
married women generally, without the need of a family settle-
ment, what had theretofore been a privilege of the aristocratic
few.
Changes like this in the property rights of married women
give point to the remark that England (and the same can be said
of America) is the most revolutionary country on earth, but the
revolutions take place without being noticed. Consider the move-
ment which has taken place in the last century in the attributes
of property in general. One need only mention such qualifications
on the rights of ownership as zoning laws, building codes, con-
servation measures, and limitations on restrictive covenants, to
say nothing of rent control, to perceive how far we .have moved
in the direction of democratization-some would say socializa-
tion-of the law of real property. We are moving slowly in the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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same direction in the legal control of intangible property, notably
the rights of members of corporations or labor unions to secure
responsible management of their interests. Our conception of
property has come a long way from that of John Locke, to whom
we owe the constitutional trinity life, liberty and property, and
to whom property appeared as one's household goods and th6
fruits of one's labors, an extension of one's personality. Prop-
erty has been largely dehumanized since the rise of large-scale
enterprise, and consists in the value of relationships within
groups to which the individual belongs, whether groups of in-
vestors or workers. The value of "property" has been all along
in "belongings," but how different the connotations of the words
have become! In the law, at least, de Tocqueville was right when
he said that the human mind more easily invents new things
than new words.24 Now the law is attempting to reconcile the
facts of industrial life with the theory of ownership, to restore
something of the old intimacy between an owner and his belong-
ings.
Along with the theme of the democratizing movement in the
law must be placed the theme of an individualizing movement.
Sometimes the two currents are in collision. The principle of
insurance, for example, as in the case of workmen's compensa-
tion or unemployment insurance, is one of the major democratiz-
ing forces in modern life. And yet it threatens the principle of
individual accountability based on personal responsibility. In the
field of unemployment insurance, one simple accommodation has
been made to the principle of individual responsibility through
the use of a merit rating system for employers.
In this conflict between the cushioning of victims through the
spreading of costs and the imposing of rewards and penalties
according to merit, Mr. Justice Brandeis thought that we had
gone too far with the insurance principle. 5 For this reason, he
favored the separate plant reserve system of unemployment com-
pensation; and he felt that fidelity insurance, whereby the man-
agers of a business were shielded from their failure to discover a
faithless employee, was an abomination. Many will disagree with
his judgment. But at least he recognized the problem with which
14. 1 Du ToCQUEVIL=, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 200 (7th ed.
1882).
15. LIF, op. cit. supra note 10, at 473.
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the law must cope in many forms--the problem of the general
security as against the unique moral claims and responsibilities
of the individual. The same contest runs through the criminal
law and through administrative law. Each has burgeoned as a
protector of the general security through the recognition of new
social duties, and each is an instrument of the democratization
of law. At the same time each has had to devise ways of individ-
ualizing its sanctions, whether through the probation and parole
procedures of the criminal law or through the dispensing power
of administrative agencies.
One of the perpetual problems of the law is when to choose a
rigid rule for the general security and when to rest on a more
individualized view of blameworthiness. Was not this really the
issue that lurked beneath the recent controversy over the ap-
pointment of a cabinet member who balked at disposing of his
stock? He seemed to regard the barrier of the conflict-of-interest
statutes as a reflection on his own integrity, for if he could not
be trusted to place the public interest first he did not deserve to
be appointed, and if he could be trusted there was no reason for
divesting himself of his stock. Those who echoed this view, in-
cluding some who saw in the statute only a bias of politicians
against business men, missed the central issue, which was
whether the problem of conflict of interest could best be dealt
with on an individualized or on a generalized basis. Anyone
familiar with the history of law, and of the idea of fiduciary
duties which pervades so much of law, would recognize these
statutes as typical prophylactic measures. They are premised on
the ground that it is unsatisfactory and unseemly to examine into
the motives or good faith of a public trustee in his official trans-
actions, and that so far as possible it is best to avoid such in-
quiries by removing the conditions that might deflect the judg-
ment either toward favoring one's private interests or, what
would be almost as bad, toward disfavoring them, in carrying on
the public business. The Government is thereby freed from the
embarrassment of special scrutiny of the officer, and the officer is
emancipated from the distractions of self-interest. That a size-
able number of citizens and commentators failed to see the issue
in terms other than the personalities involved seems to me to
reflect the lack of a general education in law.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I have been speaking of methods and movements in the law, of
the adversary system, of negotiation and accommodation, of
translation of social ideals into legal institutions, and of the
currents of democratization and individualization which may
appear in the aspect of general security and personal.uniqueness
and which may come into conflict and have to be resolved. In all
of this our law strives to adjust conflicting ideals by methodd
which are pragmatic. As William James would have said, we
define by consequences rather than by essences. If you want to
appreciate the difference, simply review the struggle of the
Supreme Court to adjust the power of the states over local
health and safety to the power of Congress over interstate com-
merce, or try to distinguish a trust from a mortgage. I honestly
believe that a better understanding of utilitarianism and prag-
matism can be had from a study of torts or contracts than from
a reading of Bentham or William James, though there is no
reason why a university student should not do both. I say this
not to assert that a Cardozo is a greater philosopher than a
James or a Dewey. I only mean that the accommodating of ideals
through the testing process of the law is an exhibition of prag-
matic thinking and not simply a discussion of it. It was a phi-
losopher, Alexander Meiklejohn, who best expressed the educa-
tional role of the Supreme Court, a role which I believe is played
by our legal institutions as a whole, and who stressed the close-
ness of the work of the Court to the proving-ground of experi-
ence:
In the American schools and colleges, thousands of men and
women are devoting their lives to the attempt to lead their
pupils into active and intelligent sharing in the activities of
self-government. And to us who labor at that task of edu-
cating Americans it becomes, year by year, more evident
that the Supreme Court has a large part to play in our
national teaching. That court is commissioned to interpret
to us our own purposes, our own meanings. To a self-gov-
erning community it must make clear what, in actual prac-
tice, self-governing is. And its teaching has peculiar impor-
tance because it interprets principles of fact and of value,
not merely in the abstract, but also in their bearing upon the
concrete, immediate problems which are, at any given mo-
ment, puzzling and dividing us. But it is just those problems
with which any vital system of education is concerned.10
16. MIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SEUF-GOVERNMENT
32 (1948).
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One has only to deal with visitors from abroad to see how much
of Anglo-American philosophy is reflected in our law. Where
they proceed with ruthless logic from large propositions of prin-
ciple, we are embarrassed when we try to frame tentative and
modest generalizations from particular instances. Our earth-
bound caution is not surprising in a legal system under which
rights grew out of procedural writs. Recently a group of German
lawyers visited my class in conflict of laws, and I learned later
that one of them had asked a student, "What is this professor's
theory of the subject?" Needless to say the student was at a loss
to answer. I recall a conversation with an eminent European
scholar who maintained that a statute held unconstitutional by
a court was as if it had never been, and could be given no effect
whatever, for otherwise the court would be making law and
thus violating the principle of separation of powers. When I
showed him an opinion of Chief Justice Hughes on the subject in
which the upshot of the discussion was that everything depended
on the precise effect to be given to interim events under the
statute,17 he was struck with the point of view but remained un-
convinced. Not long ago a class was discussing the question
whether the courts of one state should be required to enforce
the revenue claims of another state, and we canvassed arguments
pro and con. Afterwards a European student came up and said,
"Isn't the objection to such enforcement the fact that a revenue
claim is a public law?" To him the category, not the consequences,
was all-important and solved the problem. The dangers of think-
ing in slogans-whether they be "separation of powers" or "state
police power" or "public law" or "sovereignty" or "guilt by as-
sociation" or "un-Americanism"--can be attacked in many ways
in university education, and I do not presume to argue that only
an injection of legal thought can produce an antibody. What I
am suggesting is that a university overlooks a rich educational
experience when it fails to offer instruction in legal thinking as
a part of general educaton.
I do not mean to suggest that common law lawyers and judges
always succeed in freeing themselves from the tyranny of abso-
lutes. But in time the absolutes generally yield to some workable
adjustment. Take for example the problem of picketing. At one
17. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
874-378 (1940).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
time it was regarded as simply a form of economic duress which
could be dealt with like lockouts or agreements in restraint of
trade. Then for a time picketing seemed to be regarded as simply
a form of freedom of expression, the workingman's way of exer-
cising his freedom of speech. Now, however, it is recognized that
picketing is a hybrid, or a legal mermaid, if you will, and that the
role of the law is to deal with it on the specific facts, taking ac-
count of the means used and the purposes which it seeks to
achieve. Take the problem of sound trucks. By some they are
regarded as the twentieth century equivalent of the eighteenth
century coffee house or pamphleteering. To others sound trucks
appear to be an assault upon the senses of an involuntary
audience, to be classified with other forms of nuisance. But we
are working out an adjustment which recognizes that the truth
lies somewhere in between, and that the problem is really one of
regulating time and place and volume while keeping the content
or the sponsorship safe from the censorship of public officials.
Or take the case of group libel laws, making it a criminal offense
to defame racial or religious groups. To some this form of insult
or invective is the exercise of liberty of speech, to be met by
counter-argument but not by suppression or punishment. To
others, group libel is one form of ordinary defamation, and surely
slander and libel have traditionally been outside the pale of the
guarantee of freedom of expression. Here too, I suggest, we do
not make a noise like a lawyer when we simply toot one horn of
the dilemma. The real problem for legislatures and courts is to
recognize that group libel has some of the elements of political
expression and some of the elements of private defamation, and
to devise appropriate safeguards both for the speaker and for
the group. Those safeguards might include such elements of a
criminal statute as the clear and present danger test, the recog-
nition of truth as a defense, and the burden on the prosecution
of showing an intention to incite to unlawful acts. But whether
these or some other requisites are the most suitable, the impor-
tant point is that the wisest solution of the problems comes from
yielding our polar positions.
Some of the difficulty is due to the double function performed
by our judges. They must decide the case before them for the
sake of the litigants and at the same time they must write for
posterity to guide the affairs of those who come after. Judges
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are both arbiters and oracles. Some of our greatest judges have
excelled as one or the other, differently gifted as they were by
temperament and power of expression. Both are needed in the
movement of the law. The layman quite naturally reserves his
highest appreciation for the oracular judge, but the closer stu-
dent of the law can see the wisdom and virtue in a judge like
Augustus Hand who, when he wrote his opinion ruling that
James Joyce's Ulysses could not be excluded from the country,18
remarked that he was careful to say nothing that would be
quotable. One of the wisest of Mr. Dooley's stories described
the scene when the decision in the Insular Cases was handed
down, involving the power of Congress to levy a duty on products
imported from Puerto Rico.19 I paraphrase the story for want of
both a text and a brogue. Mr. Justice Brown announced that the
Constitution follows the flag but not quite everywhere. Mr.
Justice White dissented in part and concurred in part, and Mr.
Justice Gray concurred in part and dissented in part. And when
this kaleidoscope of color had ceased to revolve, a little old man
in the rear of the courtroom rose and said, "Your Honors, can I
ask a question?" The Chief Justice viewed him sternly and said,
"What is it that you want to know?" To which the little old man
replied, "Please, sir, do I get me lemons back?" Whatever the
public and the press may think, the law is at its soundest when
it does not forget the lemons.
Having made much of the fact that law is a pragmatic disci-
pline, I may fairly be asked to consider a test case: how could
general education in law contribute to a judgment on a problem
that concerns the universities in their very being-the legislative
investigations into certain affiliations of teachers. In part the
legal aspects are technical, and I would not expect laymen, how-
ever well-rounded their general education has been, to know the
precise significance of a claim of the privilege against self-in-
crimination. But I would expect them to distrust the easy gen-
eralizations we have heard on both sides, and to demand from
commentators and critics some reasoned explanation of the
privilege.
OR the one hand we have heard that since the privilege is a
18. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.
2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
19. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
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constitutional one its assertion is as colorless as the assertion by
a Congressman of his constitutional immunity for statements
made on the floor of Congress. What then of the evidently rea-
sonable practice in a number of places of suspending or discharg-
ing policemen who assert the privilege? Is the duty of frankness
less on the part of a teacher than on the part of a policeman? On
the other hand, we are told that the claim of the privilege to a
question regarding membership in the Communist Party carries
a logical inference of guilt, a confession of membership, which
is, so it is said, a crime; else how could the privilege be honestly
claimed? This is, of course, a specious chain of reasoning. Mem-
bership in the Communist Party is not in and of itself a federal
crime; the Internal Security Act expressly so states.20 What is
a crime is conspiracy under the Smith Act to advocate the violent
overthrow of the government, or establishing an organization
which so advocates, or being a member of such an organization
knowing its purposes. 21 The privilege with respect to the ques-
tion of membership rests not on the notion that an affirmative
answer would confess to a crime but, at most, that it would
furnish a link in a prosecution under the Smith Act, though the
witness may deem himself innocent of crime and indeed may be
innocent because of his personal view of the purposes of the or-
ganization. Indeed, a refusal to answer may not even be an
admission of membership. A truthful denial of past member-
ship might lead a prosecutor to focus on questions regarding
other forms of affiliation, and a truthful denial of present mem-
bership, in a series of questions, might furnish evidence useful
to a prosecutor regarding the dates of prior membership.
The legal mind can at least make it clear that the situation
is clouded with ambiguities. If the academic colleagues of the
witness who claims the privilege then seek to dispel these am-
biguities in the particular case by pressing for his motives, as
seems proper, the legal mind can furnish some perspective. We
can recall that the privilege was established in revolt against
the practice of searching out religious heresy of a witness from
his own lips, without the formality of a charge or confrontation
with accusing witnesses. The privilege has grown wider; but its
origin may have some bearing in judging those academic wit-
20. 64 STAT. 987, 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783 (f) (Supp. 1952).
21. 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1952).
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nesses who may have been Communists, but who regard Com-
munist affiliation as no more than a kind of political or economic
heresy, having nothing to do with violent overthrow or thought
control or subservience to a foreign power, and who, moreover,
are unwilling to implicate their associates whom they believe to
have been of like mind. Such individuals may, in your and my
judgment, be greatly deceived, foolish and naive; their dis-
illusionment may be slow in coming; the question is whether for
these sins they merit dismissal.
These considerations have led us directly to the case of the
admitted Communist, and I will only suggest some questions that
the legal mind may put, leaving the answers to those who have to
give them. Are we facing here still another form of that basic
dilemma of the general security and the individual conscience,
the principle of insurance, if you will, matched against the
uniqueness of personal responsibility? Can we afford the latter,
entailing scrutiny of the individual's claims, or must we forego
it, as we do in the case of a cabinet officer with conflicting finan-
cial ties? The alternatives confronting teachers are incompar-
ably harsher-loss of position and virtual blacklisting or divest-
ment of beliefs and membership (the one divestment impossible,
the other perhaps too late). Is the danger in the case of teachers
correspondingly greater, and is the conflict of loyalties as clearly
established to warrant a general rule? We have indeed adopted a
general rule for officers of labor unions, a field where there was
evidence that Communist leadership used its position for political
ends, not the ends safeguarded by the Labor Relations Act. Are
the universities, which are in the best position to judge, prepared
to say that, as a matter of their experience, Communists have as
a group shown lack of integrity in their teaching and profes-
sional writing, or been insufficiently devoted to their academic
tasks, or counselled students in ways of breaking the laws of
the land?
These are meant as honest and open questions, which seem to
have been crowded out of the public mind by the black-letter
headlines and the radio waves carrying reports of this or that
encounter of a professor with a committee. The central issue
which has to be faced is this: Shall the universities judge Com-
munists, like other nonconformists, in the light of national
security and academic integrity, on a case by case basis, as com-
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plete and complex human beings, or is this a useless and costly
luxury, and shall the universities instead lay down a blanket
characterization and a universal rule of outlawry? Shall the
universities follow, or depart from, the rule of the criminal law
that attaches importance not merely to our own understanding
of a member's commitments but to his understanding of them
as well?
Like a typical law teacher, I am more confident in asking ques-
tions than in answering them. Also like, a good teacher, I ought
to acknowledge my predilections. Where choice is fairly possible,
as between judgments in the mass and judgments of the individ-
ual, it is the latter current that needs reinforcing. The issue far
transcends the plight of a few professors. In an age of mass
politics, mass information, mass entertainment, mass communi-
cation, mass judgments, factories with so many "hands," armies
with so many " bodies," humanity is in danger of becoming a set
of statistics and stereotypes. How these movements, if suffi-
ciently exploited, can lead to the corruption and caricature of
democracy is best revealed in the Communist world itself. We
should remember, too, that our great apostles of the free spirit
are cherished for their affirmations and not for the blanket im-
personal dooms they laid down owing to expediency or the
prevailing climate of opinion. John Milton is not remembered
for his exclusion of "popery and open superstition" from the
bounds of toleration; nor John Locke for his exclusion of athe-
ists; nor John Stuart Mill for his exclusion of backward peoples
from the right of free expression.
What the world pays for is judgment, as Justice Holmes in-
sisted. In another and tragic sence what the world pays for is
mistakes of judgment. It is the business of a lawyer to seek for
evidence and to ask questions, the questions that go to the heart
of the matter. If the temper and outlook of the lawyer could be
more widely shared, perhaps we might save ourselves a little
oftener from the tragedy of mistakes of judgment. And so I
urge you to give those "lesser breeds without the law" a taste of
our austere and civilizing discipline.
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